DOCUMENT RESUME

ED 310 684 HE 022 789

AUTHOR Prestine, Nona A.
TITLE Political Systems Theory as an Explanatory Paradigm for a Governance Conflict.
PUB DATE Mar 89
NOTE 29p.; Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Educational Research Association (San Francisco, CA, March 27-31, 1989).
PUB TYPE Speeches/Conference Papers (150) -- Reports - Research/Technical (143)

EDRS PRICE MF01/PC02 Plus Postage.
DESCRIPTORS College Administration; *Decision Making; *Educational Policy; Governance; *Government School Relationship; Higher Education; *Institutional Autonomy; *Politics of Education; Teacher Education; Theories
IDENTIFIERS *University of Wisconsin Madison

ABSTRACT

A case study examining the conflict between the University of Wisconsin (UW)-Madison and the Wisconsin Department of Public Instruction (DPI) over who has decision-making authority over the content of the teacher education program is presented. Factors leading to the exacerbated struggle between UW-Madison and DPI are examined, noting Easton's political systems theory (1965, 1966) for an explanatory model to analyze the variables and processes by which DPI gained control of the teacher education program from the school. Specific focus was on internal variables from within the university which contributed to the loss of control; external forces that supported the DPI's efforts; and political processes, exchanges, and interactions involved in the conflict. The study used a set of 35 open-ended interviews with key actors and representatives of relevant stakeholder and interest groups involved in the issue. Respondents discussed the relevant areas of conflict; then these data were analyzed. A second interview focused on themes emerging from the data analysis. The political systems theory in data analysis was examined in terms of: (1) internal system variables such as role of organizational saga, insularity and isolation, pluralistic nature of the School of Education, and decentralization; and (2) external variables such as environmental mood, coalition of interest groups, role of the state superintendent, variable conditions causing system stress, and system attempts at coping with stress. These internal and external variables determined the process of exchanges and transactions between the university and the DPI. Contains 45 references. (SM)

****
* Reproductions supplied by EDRS are the best that can be made *
* from the original document. *
****

ED310684

Political System Theory as an Explanatory Paradigm for a Governance Conflict

"PERMISSION TO REPRODUCE THIS MATERIAL HAS BEEN GRANTED BY

Nona A. Prestine

TO THE EDUCATIONAL RESOURCES INFORMATION CENTER (ERIC)."

Nona A. Prestine

University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION
Office of Educational Research and Improvement
EDUCATIONAL RESOURCES INFORMATION CENTER (ERIC)

☑ This document has been reproduced as received from the person or organization originating it.

☐ Minor changes have been made to improve reproduction quality.

• Points of view or opinions stated in this document do not necessarily represent official OERI position or policy.

The 1980's witnessed the dawning of an era of unparalleled activity and interest in education spawned by a sense of national urgency not equalled since the 1957 Russian Sputnik launching. Responding to the report of the National Commission on Excellence in Education (1983) and other reports which followed it, states moved quickly to pass or promulgate hundreds of pieces of legislation and administrative rules and regulations in an attempt to rectify perceived inadequacies in the education system and to promote educational quality. This "first wave" of reform, as it has become known, was generally characterized by the legislating and mandating of controls over educational programs by state level authorities (Hawley, 1988; Kirst, 1988; and Passow, 1988) and varied considerably from state to state.

These legislative initiatives addressed numerous education concerns (McLaughlin et al., 1985) with a predominant area of activity being that of teacher preparation. These reforms in teacher education have been examined from a variety of perspectives (Corrigan, 1985; Guthrie, 1983; Hammond, 1986; Howey & Zimpher, 1986; Murray, 1986; Roth, 1985; Schuck, 1985; and Soltis, 1987). One that has been largely ignored, however, is the political view. The political frame posits that such reform initiatives can be analyzed and understood as conflicts between competing systems for the power to control teacher education programs. While political analysis of major national reform reports has received some attention (Apple, 1982, 1985; Spring, 1985a, 1985b; Stedman, 1987; Stedman & Smith, 1983), there is a paucity of data that describe or document the political process of such reform initiatives at the individual state level. Consequently, the "thick descriptions" necessary for understanding the complex nature of variables, forces and processes involved are noticeably lacking.

Presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Educational Research Association, March, 1989.

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

HE 022 789

This case study examines such a conflict between the University of Wisconsin-Madison and the Wisconsin Department of Public Instruction (DPI) over the question of who has the decision-making authority over the content of the teacher education program. Like many other public land-grant institutions, the University of Wisconsin-Madison has a broad grant of statutory authority over academic, organization and governance matters. "The faculty of each institution . . . shall be vested with the responsibility for the immediate governance of such institution and . . . shall have the primary responsibility for academic and educational activities . . . "(Wis. St. 36.09(4)) On the other hand, the Department of Public Instruction and its chief executive officer, the State Superintendent, are delegated power and authority to oversee and maintain the public education system including the licensing of teachers in part by prescribing "rule standards and procedures for the approval of teacher preparatory programs leading to certification or licensure. . ."(Wis. Stat. 115.28(7)

Historically, UW-Madison has epitomized the concept of strong faculty participation in institutional governance (Millett, 1978). This is reflective of the University's history, tradition and mission (Curti & Carstensen, 1949). "Faculty involvement in decision-making has become so ingrained in the operation of UW-Madison that the term 'faculty governance' is often used in place of the broader concept of 'shared governance.'" (The University of Wisconsin-Madison Self-Analysis, 1978, p. 28) The umbrella of such university-wide faculty governance shelters even stronger enclaves of internal control of academic program in the numerous schools and colleges under its auspices.

Correspondingly the School of Education at UW-Madison has jealously guarded its prerogative of control over academic program and policy. In the 1960's an exacerbated conflict with NCATE (National Council for Accreditation of Teacher Education) over such authority saw the University withdraw from that organization. One of the primary objections raised by Madison was that NCATE was an external organization attempting to usurp curriculum and other internal program matters from control of the School of Education (Elam, 1963; Stiles, 1963; Travelstead, 1963; Wiggins, 1964).

From the early 1970's onward, however, the School's attention was drawn to what it perceived as increasing interference by Department of Public Instruction (DPI) in the teacher preparation program. As reported by the School of Education in the self-analysis report (1978) for North Central Association review, "The substantial increase in control of programs exercised by the state's Department of Public Instruction is

currently causing concern . . . DPI is now seemingly attempting to dictate academic program content in a manner which would usurp the traditional place of faculty in designing instruction programs and courses. . . ."(p. 117).

This had been an on-going issue between several teacher preparation institutions, including UW-Madison, and the DPI. The institutions' complaint was that program approval standards were being applied unfairly and evenly from one teacher preparation program to another by DPI. It was felt that the "standards of attainment" phrase from Wisconsin Statute 115.28(7) was being used by DPI as an "open notebook." Some departments and programs were being held to what they believed were unrealistic and far too strict accountability, while similar departments and programs in other institutions were given only the most cursory of evaluations.

The University gained support for its position from the Chair of the state legislature's Assembly Education Committee, who proposed a bill limiting DPI's authority to impose rules and regulations that have not gone through the legislative process on Schools of Education. A substantially amended version of the bill eventually passed and became Chapter 28, Laws of 1979. The School of Education believed the issue was settled and interpreted the law as specifically limiting both the powers of the State Superintendent (Wis. Stat. 115.28(7)) and the general authority to promulgated rules in an areas exempted from rule making by the legislature, i.e., academic program (Wis. Stat. 227.01(11)(f)). This unfortunate misunderstanding of the statutory changes would eventually prove to be totally inaccurate but not before the School had staked its entire argument on its treacherous sands.

In the early 1980's, with the national concern that erupted over the quality of public education in general and the criticism leveled at teachers and the institutions responsible for preparing teachers specifically, the conflict between the DPI and the University rekindled. The salient issue was not whether the teacher education program needed to be changed, but the larger political question of who was to determine the content of the change and who ultimately had control over the content of the teacher preparation program. It pitted the authority of a state agency charged with the responsibility of certifying teachers for the public schools of the state against the authority of another state agency, the University, delegated with the responsibility for its academic programs and procedures.

In 1986 with the passage of a set of administrative rules and regulations, commonly cited as PI 4, the Department of Public Instruction asserted and imposed its authority over the School of Education's academic program. The PI 4 standards are specific and detailed administrative rules under which the colleges and universities in Wisconsin receive approval to train teachers for licensure in the state. Included in these standards are mandated courses in pedagogy as well as in specific academic majors and minors, prescribed course content, admission standards and graduation or exit requirements. The passage of these administrative rules marked the climax of a long and bitter conflict between the state education agency and the School of Education at the University of Wisconsin-Madison and provide a focal point and context for analyzing teacher education reform from a political systems perspective.

This study examines examines the factors that led to the exacerbated struggle between UW-Madison and the Department of Public Instruction for control of the teacher preparation program. It looks to Easton's political systems theory for an explanatory model to analyze the variables and processes by which an external agency was able to expropriate the control of the teacher education program from the internal control of the University. Specific questions addressed included: what were the internal variables within the University which contributed to the loss of control; what were the external (environmental) forces present that supported the Department's efforts; and what were the political processes, exchanges and interactions involved in the conflict?

Theoretical Framework

As an explanatory model, Easton's political systems theory (1965a, 1965b, 1966) allows for the methodical examination of the elements of a complex political system, its relevant environment, and the process of exchanges and transactions between them. This allows for the inclusion of a range of activities of substantive effect within the parameters of the research objectives and is limited only by concepts of what is significant and relevant for an understanding of the behaviors manifested in the political system under analysis. "This is precisely what we do when . . . we seek out the political aspects of interactions taken in organizational or institutional settings that are not primarily political in character. We abstract out of the total interactions in which a person engages those those are oriented to politics" (Easton, 1965a, p.43). This abstraction of the political system permits the differentiation of behavior and activities while retaining the connectedness to

phenomenal whole. As well, such abstraction for analytical purposes provides not only an orientation to the data but also crucial leads into its analysis (Blauberg, 1977).

Thompson (1967) suggests that the attainment by an organization of viable domain and protection of its core variables can be seen as essentially a political problem. Political systems theory provides an incisive means of analyzing a conflict between a system and environmental forces for control of essential or core variables. This analytic framework suggests three significant areas for examination: (1) the internal variables of the system functioning in the context of varying environmental forces, (2) the external forces in the task environment inputting demands or supports into the system, and (3) the process of transactions and exchanges transpiring between the system and its environment.

Internal variables

Easton (1965a, 1965b) suggests that what happens to a system, that is, its relative stability or change within its environment, will in large measure be a function or dysfunction of the operation of the system's internal variables. No system is completely defenseless in the face of disturbances to which it may be subjected. The processes and structure of the system rarely leave it completely vulnerable to the vagaries of chance. The system may be able to manipulate its environment or environmental circumstances will dictate modification of the system or both. It is the internal variables which will interpret the environmental demands and determine the system's response to such stresses and, ultimately, will be responsible for the success or failure of such responses. Stresses may be reduced or even aborted if the system is willing and able to take measures to modify existing structural or cultural regulators. Thus, the ultimate success or failure of a system's response to external demands is primarily a function of the operation of its internal variables.

Easton (1965a) also postulates that while every system through its internal variables has the ability to insulate itself, at least in part, from externally imposed stresses, no system has succeeded in accomplishing this either completely or permanently. This relates closely to Thompson's (1967) view of organizations as open systems, continually striving to become less so. He suggests that under "norms of rationality," (p.20) organizations seek ways to minimize uncertainty. Since such uncertainty cannot be eliminated from the environment, organizations or systems seek to protect or insulate their "technical core", what Easton (1965a) calls "essential variables," from threatening environmental stresses.

The "essential variables" that a political system seeks to protect as their domain include the making and executing of "decisions for society and their relative frequency of acceptance as authoritative or binding by the bulk of society" (Easton, 1965a, p. 96). While this does not imply an absoluteness, an all or nothing condition under which these variables operate, any disturbance which induces changes in the characteristic modes of functioning of these variables in a system, or has the potential to do so, represents a threat to the system. "It offers the members of a system a chance to regulate or eliminate the stressing conditions or to shield the system from them. Whether or not the potential is actualized to the detriment of the system will depend upon the ability of the members of the system to deal with the conditions creating the stress" (Easton, 1965a, p. 90).

External Forces

Easton defines environmental or external forces as "that part of the social and physical environment that lies outside the boundaries of a political system and yet within the same society" (1965a, p. 71). While the political system is conceptually distinct from all other systems, it nonetheless also exists as an open system. Thus, external forces, while outside of the system boundary nevertheless exert a great deal of influence on the political system itself. Changes in the environment of a system can place heavy demands on a system and lead to an untenable situation in which changes are forced upon the existing system.

Yet, not all the environmental influences reach the status of a demand on the system. Before it is articulated as such, a demand exists first as a general opinion, preference, motive or the like which can be generically denoted as a want. If it is to pass from this stage and be transformed into a demand on the system, some person or group must adopt, advance and advocate it as the way in which a system must act in order to fulfill this want. When this happens, the want has become a demand. It has been put into the political system, and the want has become politicized. As well, there will be a decline in the support for a system when demands remain either unfulfilled or are perceived as being unfulfilled. If the imbalance between the demands and the perceived outputs of the system continues, the system may be ripe for assault on its essential or core variables. "In the normal course of events, lack of support is the prelude to important changes of some kind" (Easton, 1965b, 220).

Easton (1965b) defines this decline in support for a system as "output failure" (p. 59). Such output failure may occur when a system fails to take action to meet the demands being put into the system. This

results in an imbalance between what has been indicated should be done and what the system is able or willing to do. Even where the means may be available, the system may remain quite unresponsive to the demands of politically potent segments. "The social origins, ideological perspectives, accessibility to pressure from different social groups and the perceptiveness of the authorities all help to determine the groups to which the authorities will be more likely to make concessions or to whose wishes they will listen more attentively and grant greater consideration" (Easton, 1965b, pp. 57-58). Thus, the external variables assume an importance and are related in direct proportion to the internal variables and the processes that exist between the two. Because of this interrelatedness, stress on a political system is actually a function of two factors: the volume and content of demands, on the one hand, and the responses available to a system for meeting and handling such demands on the other. Stated another way, stress on a system is the function of the interrelationship between external demands and internal responses.

Demands may act as stressors on a system because they possess the potential to push the essential variables of the system to their critical limits. Such essential variables of a political system include the making and executing of decisions for society and the relative frequency of acceptance of these authoritative and binding decisions by society. If demands push these essential variables beyond their critical limits, the political system will cease to exist. However, the operant word in understanding the effects of demands as stressors on a system is "potential." A demand need not push these essential variables to their critical limits in order to be considered stressful to a system. "If disturbances can just be assessed as having the potential for doing so, that is, as representing a threat or pressure in that direction, they will be noted as stressful." (Easton, 1965a, p.95)

Processes

Analysis of political processes provides the thread that binds together the whole fabric of the political system mosaic. The whole becomes greater than a sum of its parts as this accounts for the dynamic nature of the constant interaction between the system variables and the environmental factors as well as how these variables and forces shape and mold each other. The identification of the internal variables of a political system and the external forces affecting it is of little analytic value and offers limited insight in and of itself. Rather, it is the added and absolutely essential element of process analysis which stresses the operation of political interactions that lends a dynamic character to the political analysis (Easton, 1965a). It becomes evident that it is

the on-going nature of the exchanges and interactions between the internal variables of the system and the demands from the external forces that breathe life into the political process analysis. It is on this critical element of dynamic interplay that political systems theory rests and through which it can be understood. "It is helpful to interpret political phenomena as constituting an open system, one that must cope with problems generated by its exposure to influences from these environmental systems. . . .From this perspective, systems analysis of political life responds most sensitively and rewardingly when questions are posed that seek to unravel the processes through which a political system is able to cope with the various stresses imposed upon it" (Easton, 1965a, p. 25).

What is also implied in this conceptualization of the dynamic nature of the processes involved in political systems analysis, is that while the system is interactive with its environment, it also retains a freedom of choice and action. In other words, the political system is intricately and intimately affected and shaped by the exchanges and interactions with its environment but maintains an independence of decision and action. Much like the Calvinist doctrine of "free will," the political system is capable of and has available to it a variety of choices of actions and responses. It is not bound by a predestined fate to simply passively attempt to absorb one disturbance after another, trying each time to re-establish some old point of stability. Of course, whether or not the system selects wisely from those options available to it in reacting to a stressful condition is another question.

This implies that the persistence of a system, that is, its capacity to continue the production of authoritative allocations of valued things, will depend upon maintaining a viable exchange and interaction with the external forces affecting it. This means that the political system will be able to cope with disturbances thrust upon it and to seek to regulate them in some constructive manner to alleviate the existing or potential stress. This frame suggests a pattern of analysis for the political process: "It suggests that we should examine the following variables: first, the nature of the inputs; second, the variable conditions under which they will constitute a stressful disturbance on the system; third, the environmental and systematic conditions that generate such stressful conditions; fourth, the typical ways in which systems have sought to cope with stress; fifth, the role of information feedback; and finally, sixth, the part that outputs play in these conversion and coping processes" (Easton, 1965a, p.132).

A final note of caution. This manner of conceptualizing a political system for analytical purposes into apparently separate categories may be unintentionally misleading. Easton (1965a, 1965b) argues that a political system is an open system in the sense that it is, in varying degrees, exposed and vulnerable to events that occur in its environment. Thus, the ways internal variables function, external demands are imposed and reactions occur in response to such demands (i.e., processes) are products of what takes place in the context of the total system and its environment. Internal and external variables assume a reciprocal importance and relationship that is dependent on the processes and exchanges that exist between them. The parameters of internal variables, external forces and processes as used here are entirely arbitrary abstractions used for heuristic purposes. Such arbitrary divisions must be viewed only as a means to an end; that is, such system analysis by category provides a convenient conceptual framework for data analysis.

Research Problem and Procedures

The major objective of this study was to examine the variables and forces which were part of and determined the course of the conflict between the University of Wisconsin-Madison and the Department of Public Instruction for control of the teacher education program. A case study approach was employed to provide a holistic mode of inquiry that would be consonant with and responsive to an exploration of the political variables and forces present (Patton, 1980; Yin, 1981a; 1981b). As well, this method allowed the discovery of the political processes and context characteristics that shed light on the issue involved. As noted by Rist (1982), addressing the general question of "'What's going on here?' is at once disarmingly simply and incredibly complex." (p. 440).

Case Selection

The selection of UW-Madison as the focus of this case study was determined by two major factors: The purpose of the research and the interest of the researcher (Guba & Lincoln, 1981; Merriam, 1985). While there are twelve cluster campuses in the University of Wisconsin System as well as another eighteen independent colleges in the state with teacher preparation programs all affected by the same issue, the uniqueness of the Madison campus determined its selection. Such a choice was warranted because the overall goal of the

research was to examine the power struggle involved in this conflict and an exemplary instance was needed to fully document the political process (Yin, 1984).

Along with an extraordinary tradition of institutional autonomy and faculty control of academic matters, Madison is the recognized flagship of the state's University System, or as one respondent phrased it, "the jewel in the crown." Its prestige and renown as a world-class research university accord it a status and power different from the other universities and colleges in the state. It was the sum of these very qualities that also made it a lightning rod for this conflict.

Methodology

The design and methodology of this case study provided not only appropriate procedures and techniques for the examination of the political conflict between the University of Wisconsin-Madison and the Department of Public Instruction, but a relevant historical perspective(Gottschalk, 1963). In general, data collection consisted of an application of two sets of interviews, in-depth and focused, with principal participants involved in the issue, examination of several forms of documentary and archival evidence, and observation of general School of Education meetings and School of Education Program Committee meetings.

A set of 35 open-ended depth interviews included the key actors and representatives of relevant stakeholder and interest groups involved in this issue. University of Wisconsin-Madison administrators, deans and professors and Department of Public Instruction officials were interviewed along with State legislators, System administrators, representatives of cluster campuses and independent colleges, DPI Task Force members and interest group representatives. Starting from an initial list of eleven key respondents, the researcher either was referred by these individuals to other relevant sources or had these sources emerge from the on-going data analysis process. Each of these interviews lasted between one and two hours and four lasted more than three hours. These interviews were conducted over a nine month period of time (September, 1987 to May, 1988) and most took place in the respondents' offices or places of employment. Six pre-study interviews with key actors were conducted in November, 1986, and contributed to the focus and clarification of parameters of this study.

During the first set of depth interviews, the respondents were asked first to generally discuss the relevant areas of the conflict with which they were most closely involved. In effect, this allowed the researcher to retrospectively assemble a complete picture of the conflict from the pieces supplied by each source most

closely involved. The interviews then focused on substantive areas of interest. An interview protocol was developed using open-ended questions to explore substantive themes which emerged from data analysis of the initial eleven key respondent interviews. The purpose of these open-ended questions was to serve as prompts in asking questions for the researcher during the interviews, but not to direct respondents' responses. Respondents were encouraged to initiate and explore new perceptions.as well as to expand on emerging substantive themes. Because of this format, the scope and sequence of the interview topics were largely determined by the individual respondent and varied from interview to interview.

The second set of interviews, which involved a more focused method, commenced as preliminary analysis of the first set of depth interviews continued (Owens, 1982; Rist, 1982). The focused interviews were with respondents more indirectly associated with the conflict as well as specific follow-ups with the key respondents and were of a much shorter duration, lasting less than one hour. While still open-ended, the questions followed a structure determined by the researcher and focused on substantive themes emerging from the data analysis. In several cases more than one follow up interview was necessary with a given individual. Numerous members checks (Owens, 1982) were also conducted most frequently by telephone throughout the data collection phase.

A rich variety of documentary and archival evidence was also available for data collection. Because the records of state agencies are considered public, access was gained to files, legal opinions, and internal memoranda of the University Committee, the School of Education, and the DPI. Document analysis was also used with record of the DPI Task Force meetings and reports, the report of the University System Task Force, the legislative hearings and analysis, testimony given on the proposed rules, and newspaper accounts of the issue.

Because most of the direct confrontations had concluded by the time this research was started, data from observation was least revealing. However, attendance at School of Education Program Committee meetings from September, 1987 to May, 1988 and observation of a general meeting of the School of Education in December, 1986 did allow for some intuitive feel of faculty reaction to the promulgated rules.

The data collection procedures used, the length of time for data collection on site, and use of multiple sources of evidence contributed to an understanding of the issues, familiarity and rapport with the key participants, and a knowledge of the interactions and history of the relations between the University and the

Department of Public Instruction (Guba & Lincoln, 1981; Owens, 1982). To obtain the necessary hard data, it was necessary to gather evidence and verify information from all sources, thereby reinforcing interview information with written testimony, archival records or another interview. In this manner potential problems of construct validity were addressed as multiple sources of evidence essentially provide multiple measures of the same phenomenon (Rist, 1982).

Data Analysis

The data collection procedures described above resulted in a multitude of statements, testimony, documents and observations. Following the requirements of the cyclical and on-going nature of qualitative inquiry, data analysis commenced as collection continued (Owens, 1982; Rist, 1982; Yin 1984). Throughout this study it was frequently the data analysis that led to new avenues of inquiry to be explored through data collection.

To organize the data in some systematic manner and assist in making judgments about the meaning and importance of the lines of inquiry, the researcher decided upon a thematic strategy of data analysis. This thematic approach emphasizes the clustering and presentation of material by key themes found in the study (Rist, 1982) and follows closely the selection of the political systems approach for the theoretical framework of the study. Three broad sets of conceptualizations or themes emerged from the data: (1) statements, accounts and documents associated with internal system variables; (2) statements, accounts and documents concerned with external environmental forces; and (3) data reflective of the process of the conflict. These themes are reflective of the nature of the research question guiding the inquiry, the theoretical framework, and the sources available for data collection. Data were then further analyzed in searching for regularities and patterns within each of the themes or topics. These became the "coding categories" (Bogden & Biklin, 1982, p.156) used as a means of further sorting the data collected.

In general, data revealed that four coding categories of internal system variables shaped and framed the response of the University. Two of these variables concerned the internal culture of the system: the role of the organizational saga in shaping and framing the University's response to external threat and the isolation and insularity of the University as protection and expression of its cultural norms. The other two variables related to the internal system structure of the University: the pluralistic nature of the membership of the School of

Education with its loose ties to the structure and the effect of decentralization on University response to external threat.

Data also indicated that three categories of external environmental forces were of importance. These included the general public mood setting the stage for the proposed teacher education rules; the formation of a successful coalition of external interest groups advocating change; and the role of the State Superintendent in pursuing promulgation of the proposed rules.

Finally, the process theme revealed two categories for data analysis. One of these concerned the variable conditions causing stress for the system. The other involved system attemtps at coping with and responding to the stress.

Political Systems Theory in Data Analysis

Internal System Variables

The Role of Organizational Saga. One of the most potent internal cultural variables identified was the overwhelming belief of UW-Madison in the role of faculty governance and the inviolability of the statutory grant of authority to the faculty over its academic programs. Some respondents called this control over program academic freedom . Some called it faculty governance. Others referred to it as institutional autonomy. Regardless of the label all referred to the same emotionally laden phenomenon. "The Madison argument has always been academic freedom. It's their institution; they should have full rein over its content." "Historically, Madison has had lots of autonomy to do whatever they wanted." "They believe that it is their God-given domain to decide on these matters; that the program belong to them by academic freedom rights."

This cultural belief has evolved into an organizational saga (Clark, 1971, 1983). As such, it colored and distorted the perception of the external threat posed by DPI's initiatives in gaining control of the teacher education program and impaired the system's response. The trappings of traditional faculty independence and perceived statutorily granted invulnerability delayed and fragmented any serious efforts to organize or coordinate opposition. It was simply inconceivable to most faculty and administration that such a thing could happen. Respondents on both sides of the issue agreed that no one took DPI's initiatives seriously at first. The School of Education believed that its legal position, based on its interpretation of previously cited statutory changes in 1979, was unassailable even though University counsel was never contacted to corroborate such beliefs. "I

think our understanding of the legislation was hope more than anything else." "It was [an Associate Dean's] refusal to believe that the State Superintendent could impose rules. The advise was based on wishful thinking." "They [the School of Education) knew it was coming and they buried their heads in the sand." In effect, the School of Education heard what it wanted to hear and believed what it wanted to believe. As Clark (1983) pointed out, a saga can "produce a striking distortion, with the organization becoming the only reality, the outside world illusion"(p. 374). From the inception of the DPI's Task Force on Teaching and Teacher Education in 1982 until the publication of the proposed rules in the fall of 1985, the School held stubbornly to an indefensible and inaccurate legal position.

If the final realization of the seriousness and determination of the DPI's initiative came as a shock to the School of Education in the fall of 1985, it shook the College of Letters and Science to its very core as awareness dawned that the rules also covered the academic majors and minors of teacher education students. While professional schools have learned to live with varying amounts of regulation, the College of Letters and Science at UW-Madison has been somewhat of an icon of professional autonomy and academic independence. As one dean stated, "Nobody tells L&S what to do." The organizational saga of faculty control and academic freedom achieves its highest degree of credence and practice in the College of Letters and Science. The L&S faculty's reaction progressed from initial disbelief and denial to eventual indignation and outrage. This quickly involved the Faculty Senate and its executive arm, the University Committee, in the general fracas. Yet, little could be accomplished by that late date.

Insularity and Isolation. As previously noted, Thompson (1967) has suggested that organizations as open systems are constantly striving to become less so. Such efforts are aimed at protecting or insulating their technical core or essential variables. This protectionist behavior extends as well to the cultural norms of the system and plays a significant role in perpetuating the singular and identifiable character of the system. Thus, a factor closely allied to institutional saga was the cultural norm of isolationist behavior which promoted a sense of superiority, power, and differentness. A relative intransigence and resistance to suggestions not internally generated was noted by several respondents. "We've had a history of telling people to get lost, of being unfriendly." "There is an overall institutional resistance to the environment. There has always been a resistance to external demands and an unwillingness to respond." While this behavior sought to insulate the system from

those who would chip away at its foundation (Easton, 1965a) and lessen its distinctive status, it also had the unintended consequence of isolating the University from potential supports.

This insularity extended to the University's relationships with several significant external groups including the other System campuses. Influenced by diverse perspectives, traditions and histories, the differences often boil down to differences between Madison and everyone else. ("Madison is different. They see themselves as different and they are.") Such differences have caused the University's relationships with the other System campuses often to devolve into acrimonious and divisive wrangling. "It's not unheard of for other campuses to say, if Madison does it, we'll do the opposite. There's not a lot of love lost between us." "There's a history of animosity toward this campus . . . and resentment . . . and envy for everything from our faculty governance to salary schedule." The culture that reinforced efforts to maintain Madison's insularity and integrity did so at the expense of possible support available from the other campuses. "When the gun was at our throats, there was no support from the rest of the System."

Pluralistic Nature of the School of Education. The pluralistic nature of the School of Education at UW-Madison was identified as one of the important structural variables. Under the operant form of organization, all faculty members who help prepare future teachers are automatically members of the School of Education. Technically, every professor who has even one teacher education students in his or her classes is a member of the faculty of the School of Education with full voting priviledges. That few faculty outisde the School of Education or, for that matter, within the School took advantage of this priviledge was evidenced by poor attendance at faculty meetings and the general lack of interest in School of Education matters. "The problem is we depend on the faculty for so much. They don't take this job as seriously as they should. It becomes crisis management. This whole issue had been in the winds for three years and it hits like a bomb." "They (L&S faculty) never came to the School of Education faculty meetings until it got personal." These loose ties to structure (Easton, 1965b) made communication and coordination of any concerted action difficult.

Whether this particular structure leads to closer ties between teacher education and the liberal arts strand of the university is a point not be to be debated here. In the case under study, such diffuse and variegated membership made coordination of effort difficult, if not impossible. Consensus opinion on the issue among just the seven departments formally within the School of Education was never reached; let alone with or among

the College of Letters and Science departments or individual faculty. Several respondents commented on the difficulty of getting the School's faculty together and to communicate. "It's so hard to get the School of Education faculty together for anything. They don't communicate. Hardly anyone attends the meetings."

Decentralization. Closely related to the pluralistic nature of the School of Education is the decentralized structure of the University. The extensive decentralization evidenced by UW-Madison made any coordination of common endeavor extremely difficult. The conflict with the DPI called for some measured, managed, consensus response and the University was simply unable to respond in an appropriate manner. Several respondents faulted the decentralized structure. "As far as decentralization in responding to outside challenges, it's a bad structure." "With political issues, the governance structure can't deal with them." "It's too decentralized. The fundamental breakdown was an inadequate organizational structure."

In this particular case, decentralization combined with entrenched principles of faculty governance offered an especially potent combination. Such a system has the effect of virtually hamstringing any efforts of administrators to provide strong leadership or make authoritative decisions. "Deans don't exercise real leadership. Deans look bad if faculty grumble, so they don't make decisions." The decentralized system allowed no clear positions of authority for those who endeavored to speak with a coordinated, unified voice for the University. As several respondents noted, if a dean attempts to exercise real leadership, that person "won't be dean for very long. There is always a part of the faculty that doesn't agree." The underlying principles of academic freedom in a decentralized system allow for and even encourage individual viewpoints and actions. This was manifested in a single department within the School of Education that had one professor serving as the Chair of the UW-System Task Force, another serving as Project Director of the DPI's Task Force and a third on leave of absence to serve as Deputy State Superintendent.

Similar dysfunctional elements of decentralization plagued any effort to unify and coordinate response in the College of Letters and Sciences as well. Large numbers of L&S faculty were either not aware of the impending DPI rules or simply did not pay any attention to them until they were nearly a fait accompli. An eleventh hour attempt to head off the impending promulgation of the rules was made in November, 1985, with department chairs asked to comment on the rules as they applied to their academic area. The fulsome range of responses reflected both the manic speed at which events were moving as well as poor communication. Some

departments found nothing objectionable in the proposed rules. "There doesn't seem to be much concern with the over-all thrust of the recommendations." Others were bewildered by them. "It is difficult for us to understand exactly what the authors of this section intend." Others raised rancorous objections. "Not a single member saw merit in the DPI draft. . . " One department completely misread the rules, thought they were proposed for the K-12 sector and heartily endorsed them.

The decentralized structure that hindered a unified response was especially detrimental to the University in presenting its case at the legislative hearings in December, 1985. Opposition testimony from the University came from individual professors or deans. None represented a consensus position. "The thing the legislature found so annoying was that no one speaks for the faculty as a group. The legislators kept getting different messages. They begin to wonder why they can't get their act together." In fact, the internal system variables of decentralized structure and underlying culture of the University made it difficult, if not impossible, for faculty to do so.

External Variables

Environmental Mood. The promulgation of the PI 4 rules came during what arguably might be considered one of the most turbulent periods of educational scrutiny and crisis in our nation's history. Heralded by *A Nation at Risk* (1983) and followed by a blitzkrieg of national media exposure, the perceived educational crisis was couched in terms of no less than a national emergency. Much as when education had borne the country's indignation and fear over the Russian's successful Sputnik launching, so now it became the "whipping boy" for the huge foreign trade deficit and fear for the economic security of the nation. The conditions in the environment were ripe for an outcry for political action to remedy the situation (Easton, 1965b).

If schools were producing an inadequate product then the teachers must be at fault and, by implication, the institutions that prepare teachers. Unlike the massive dose of federal monies poured into education in the late 1950's, the "Reagonomics" of the 1980's would look to the individual states for remedy. State legislatures, university study groups, distinguished educational leaders, and a host of self-proclaimed educational "experts" produced a plethora of recommended remedies and reforms. Thus, the demand for change clearly originated in the environment. As one respondent stated, "If the public had perceived teachers as well prepared, this issue wouldn't have come up."

It is questionable whether the general public's view of the state of education could have carried the day if it were not for a concomitant lack of support for the University from significant external groups, including UW-System administration and the other System campuses. As Easton (1965b, p. 57-58) noted, "The stress occasioned for a system as a result of dissatisfaction with the way in which or degree to which demands are fulfilled is due to a decline in support, and not strictly to the character of the demands themselves." Compounding the public's perception of the quality of the education in general, an unfavorable sentiment existed toward UW-Madison among several important groups in the environment. The most significant of these groups was the state legislature. A variety a reasons existed for the legislature's displeasure with the University (including a messy and bloody catch-up pay fight between System campuses fought out on the floor of the legislature), but the bottom-line analysis was that the state legislature was not about to take Madison's side in any dispute at this time. "Positions have hardened in the legislature. Those who thought this campus should be treated special have found that the legislature disagreed. There was a feeling of wanting to cut us down to size among some legislators." "The legislators will have another chance to do some University of Wisconsin-bashing under the guise of improving prospective teachers."

The general mood of the public demanded directive, assertive action. As had happened in other times of national crisis, people generally were more willing to tolerate the extension of power by central authorities than under more normal circumstances (Wallenfeldt, 1983). The primary imperative became to rectify the situation by whatever means necessary. As a state legislator noted, "It's a sign of the times. The call for university autonomy is secondary to the call for standards."

With its statutory responsibility for licensure of teachers in the state, the DPI was in a position to be especially sensitive to the mood of the environment in regard to the preparation of teachers. Heightened public concerns provided if nothing else a propitious moment for the promulgation of rules which had been under development for several years. 'Interest groups are constantly searching for expressed or latent wants that, within the framework of their beliefs, they can appropriately adopt and around which they may formulate political policy alternatives" (Easton, 1965b, p.96). It was, as the State Superintendent noted, "a moment in the history of teacher education" to be captured and used and was neither wasted nor squandered by the Department.

Coalition of Interest Groups. The Department of Public Instruction was not the only external force in the environment sensitive to the prevailing mood and that wished to see change in the teacher education program. An extremely successful and powerful coalition of groups were brought in and joined with the Department"s efforts. Politically and morally, the most powerful of these groups was the Wisconsin Education Association Council (WEAC). From a political perspective, WEAC is one of the strongest legislative lobbyist group in the state. As the representative of the teacher practitioners in the field, WEAC support lends a certain moral sanction to educational issues.

While philosophically committed to raising teacher preparation standards, other motivations also prompted WEAC's unqualified support for the proposed rules. For years the union had felt shut out of the universities, especially UW-Madison. "There's been a long history of strained relationship between us and the University. They're arrogant, they're elitist, and they don't listen to anybody. Now they're going to have to listen." The proposed reforms of the PI 4 rules promised increased control, albeit through DPI, over teacher education programs. At a deeper level much of this antagonism can be explained by differing perspectives of the two organizations over collective bargaining and unionization issues. Several respondents felt this to be a significant factor. "WEAC was probably so anti-University because the union notion has always fallen flat on this campus."

Along with WEAC, a well rounded field of interest groups was recruited by the Department. School board association members, district administrators, principals, teachers, business and industry leaders, labor and higher education representatives served on the Superintendent's Task Force on Teaching and Teacher Education. As the Chair of the state legislature's Assembly Education Committee commented, "Everyone else was with the DPI. . . .This was a classic stereotype of groups lined up. All the education groups versus the University."

The Task Force's primary importance derived from its successful attempt to coalesce these highly influential interest groups into one body working under DPI's direction on a common venture--that of improving teaching and teacher education. The final report of the Task Force offered something to nearly everyone. As Easton (1965b) noted, out of the range of ideas available to win over and maintain support of an effort, those selected must have the widest possible appeal to the members. It was, as the State Superintendent commented, "a classic example of public policy development." The sense of unity, participation and input these group

representatives experienced through their Task Force work carried over to their eventual support of the PI 4 regulations. Recruits became zealots. This is more than adequately documented in the humerous public statements, the volume of correspondence to state legislators, and the testimony offered at the legislative hearing by these groups and their representative members in support of the proposed rules.

Role of the State Superintendent. A key external variable relates to the unique position of the State Superintendent. In Wisconsin, the position of State Superintendent is filled in a nonpartisan election every four years with the individual becoming the chief executive officer of the Department of Public Instruction. Because there is no state board of education, the Superintendent, as an elected official, represents and must be responsive to a state wide constituency but is not directly answerable to any higher or controlling authority. Policy direction and decisions are bounded only by the inclination of the Superintendent, statutory limitations, and/or legislative consent in the form of appropriations or approval of administrative rules. Thus, much is dependent on the individual occupying the position. Legally the power to regulate and mandate changes by rule promulgation had been statutorily granted to the State Superintendent and the Department of Public Instruction since 1979. It was the decision of the newly elected Superintendent in 1981 to use such authority. Until this time, the DPI relied on guidelines, as they had done in the past, but no rules had been promulgated through the legislative process.

As well, the elected Superintendent also becomes one of two ex officio members of the Board of Regents of the University of Wisconsin System. The reciprocal role positions offer a potentially powerful combination (Bertrand, 1972). While the power and opportunity to use such power have always rested in the dual positions, much is dependent upon the person who occupies the dual role positions. Partisan feelings still run high on this issue so objectivity may be questionable but there was virtual unanimity among the University's supporters that such power was abused and that a conflict of interest existed. ("Most important was [his] smooth political machine and his position on the Regents. He forced the top administration to compromise with him on this. He used his Regents position.") Most of these respondents felt that the Superintendent had used his position as a Regent to bully and intimidate System campuses as well as System administration into staying out of the conflict.

Supporters of the DPI and the Superintendent see this in different terms. While most agreed that the Superintendent made use of his Regent position, they saw this in a much less sinister and nefarious context. "[He's] the most activist Superintendent in this century. Others just came and sat [on the Board of Regents]. He's not like that." Only one respondent completely denied any conflict of interest, calling such allegations, "a red herring."

There was admittedly an underestimation of the political acumen, aggressiveness, and savvy of the new Superintendent. As he stated, "The truth of the matter is that while others slept, we were toiling upward in the night. They didn't think we could do it and deliver a product of this scope." Guided by a clear vision and firm determination, the Superintendent was not to be deterred from his chosen course. Also, as a former Wisconsin state legislator, the Superintendent was not unfamiliar with playing political hardball to achieve his ends. ("We slam-dunked it in the Assembly Committee.") Whether one perceives this as masterful political skill ("[The State Superintendent] is a consummate politician.") or devious Machiavellian manipulations ("He used every political trick in the book.") is dependent on where one stood on the conflict.

Process

Variable Conditions Causing System Stress. In the context of the political systems model the persistence of a system, that is, its capacity to continue the production of authoritative allocation of valued things, will depend upon the system maintaining a viable exchange and interaction with the external forces affecting it. In this case, the efforts of the University to maintain control over the content of the teacher education program were contingent upon its ability to cope with the stresses from the external forces thrust upon it and its ability to regulate these stresses in some constructive manner.

Disturbances to a system will vary with respect to their consequences for that system. Two significant variable conditions existed which caused the proposed rules to become stressful for the University. While the proposed rules were unacceptable to the system in and of themselves, the system may have been able to significantly mediate their effect or even halt their eventual promulgation except for the legality issue. The School of Education's preeminent argument, at least until the fall, 1985, was based on an inaccurate interpretation of the statutory changes. This had the net effect of placing the system at a disadvantage from which it never recovered. Not only did it place the School of Education in the rather embarrassing and inane

position of presenting arguments based on statutory language that did not exist, it helped perpetuate a misunderstanding of the correct language that amended Wis. Stat. 227.01(11)(f) which dealt with exemptions to the rule-making process. Because of this misunderstanding potential allies and supporters were not solicited; counter-recommendations were never developed. Political systems theory posits that information feedback is an absolute essential for a system to correctly interpret not only its environment but the effect of its actions.

The force of the law was on the Department's side because of the statutory changes embodied in Chapter 28, Laws of 1979. A legal opinion written for DPI clearly states the correct interpretation and the limitations the statutes in question: "These statutes clearly give the department and the state superintendent specific authority to prescribe approval standards for teacher education programs and to prescribe by rule the professional training a teacher must receive. . . .(I)f the department can articulate how a challenged rule is reasonably related to the purpose of the rule, that to ensure adequate teacher preparation, then it is likely the rule will be upheld."

The Department reinforced its legal position by offering the proviso that no one had to follow these rules. The State Superintendent could establish standards for an approved program of study leading to certification for a teaching license, but could not eliminate or terminate any program. In that happy course of events, a student could be admitted to the University and the School of Education, complete his course work along with a major and minor and end up not certified to teach. As one DPI official commented, "You can have your academic freedom, except we won't certify them." The other equally unattractive alternative offered by the Department was simply to abandon the teacher education program at the Madison campus entirely. Not only did the Department have the force of law behind its actions, it also effectively controlled the politics of the situation. The Department also anticipated and read the mood of environment in mobilizing external support for their position. The DPI's Task Force on Teaching and Teacher Education is a prime example of such initiative. As the State Superintendent noted, "We brought in a very representative group and had it chaired by a higher ed person. . . The point is, that if objectively reviewed, the structure of the study and its end product is a classic example of public policy development." The Task Force held state-wide public hearings on proposed recommendation for the first half of 1983 and submitted a final draft in December, 1983.

System Attempts at Coping with Stress . The reaction of political system to stressful external demands depends to a large extent on the degree to which the system is responsive and receptive to such demands. Response requires time, yet the system must act quickly enough to meet the needs to the situation. In November, 1983, the University belatedly made an effort at response to the environmental demands by forming its own task force on teacher education. This task force included 12 representatives from System institutions and was chaired by a former Executive Vice-President of the UW System. In October, 1984, this task force issued their final report, entitled, *Benchmarks of Excellence* (1984, University of Wisconsin System Teacher Education Task Force).

A comparison of this report and the earlier DPI document revealed that the main point of divergence is over the political issue of control. The *Benchmarks* (1984) document recommended changes in teacher education, some of which closely paralleled those made in the DPI report and are so referenced, but placed responsibility for such program changes firmly under the control of the Schools of Education and their respective faculties. It was the key phrases "to be determined by the faculty"(p. 9), "the faculty review"(p. 10), "responsibility of the faculty"(p. 10), "the faculty responsible for courses"(p.11) that touched the heart of the matter.

The timing of *Benchmarks* (1984) proved detrimental to its reception and frittered away much of its potential impact. Published nearly a year after the DPI Task Force report, it had the appearance of a hurried institutional response to a situation quickly slipping out of the control of the University. In fact, by the time the System task force was finally formed, the University had not only lost the initiative but the tenor of the times had changed. Mandating, ordering and legislating were the new order of the day. ("The [Benchmarks] report was too collegial in tone for the times . . . A year earlier [it] might have been effective.") By this time, few outside the University had much patience with the niceties and subtleties of collegial debate, compromise and consensus building.

Other factors were involved in the failure of this system response to have more substantial effect in mediating environmental demands. The conflict itself was taking place in the context of a larger arena of activity. It was not a number one priority for everyone who played powerful if passing roles in the unfolding drama. As well, although *Benchmarks* (1984) was never intended to be directive, this was perhaps a vital and

missing ingredient. "It is true, in most cases, that verbal output may ultimately need to be backed up with at least some token performance. It may be considered incomplete without subsequent actions to follow up the statements" (Easton, 1965a, p. 353). While there was virtual agreement among University respondents that reform in teacher education was needed, the system failed to produce any concomitant commitment to a solid plan for change.

The University finally pinned its hopes on legislative contacts and allies in the Assembly Education Committee to "carry the day for them." Such hopes and expectations proved ill-founded and fruitless. In November, 1985, the University Committee arranged for a "discussion" of the proposed PI 4 rules with state legislators and DPI officials. While providing a forum for the University to vent its grievances and concerns, several respondents noted that the meeting deteriorated into little more than a debate and verbal sparring match between the University and DPI officials before a bewildered and dismayed audience of legislators. ("It was a bomb. . . a bad idea.") Anticipated University lobbying efforts with the legislators were confounded and met with little, if any success.

On the other hand, the Department of Public Instruction's political initiatives were meeting with greater success. Both preceding and following this meeting the same DPI officials met with representatives of interest groups supportive of the Department's position. These were neither isolated nor coincidental occurrences. The Department, mainly through the efforts of the Deputy State Superintendent, was maintaining almost weekly contacts with legislators and interest groups and had been doing so for months. If the University fumbled politically, the Department did not.

Summary and Conclusions

The use of political systems as an explanatory model for this conflict revealed that four internal cultural and structural system variables (the role of the organizational saga; the isolation and insularity of the University; the pluralistic nature of the membership of the School of Education; and the effect of decentralization on University response)and three external environmental forces (the prevailing general public mood; the formation of a successful coalition of external interest groups; and the role of the State

Superintendent) determined the process of exchanges and transactions between UW-Madison and the Department of Public Instruction.

The University, by choosing to ignore, disregard and underestimate the prevailing public mood and the very serious intentions of the Department of Public Instruction, placed itself at a disadvantage from it never recovered. As Easton (1965b) has noted, even though a political system has ways and means of regulating and coping with stressful disturbances from its environment, this does not mean that all systems will behave adaptively or are equally successful in doing so. Whether or not the system responses are successful will depend upon the ability of the system to deal with the conditions creating the stress. The reasons why the University chose such a disastrous path are embedded in its internal system variables. The themes of institutional saga, decentralization and insularity weave in and out of any such rationale. "The institutional culture here carries this independence to an art form. . . .They are totally committed to academic freedom." "The culture is different. There are traditions of academic governance and freedom. . ." Such words and sentiment are part of the litany of the faithful, the true believers, and they are as appealing and alluring as the idea of Madison as "the jewel in the crown." However, when invoked against intrusion of powerful environmental forces, such incantations have lost their power. Such system beliefs no longer carry the legitimizing force among the general public they once possessed. Political system theory suggests, these beliefs may have become "shopworn," that is, no longer relevant or meaningful, much like ideas of divine right and aristocratic responsibility. As one state legislator noted, "The sacred nature of the University isn't what it used to be."

The University "lost" the conflict over control of the teacher education program because it was unable to rally any substantial support from its environment. The internal cultural and structural variables of institutional autonomy and decentralization led the system in this case to the isolation and fragmentation that contributed to its eventual defeat. In large part because of the insularity and unresponsiveness of the University to external demands, the Department of Public Instruction was able to assume a proactive role. A wide public was already convinced that extensive educational reforms were needed. The Department anticipated and read the mood of the environment and used it to their advantage in mobilizing external coalition support for their position. It was not difficult, or in some cases, even necessary, to persuade other external groups that the relative insularity and intransigence of the University would only be changed by concerted external efforts. "The

newly emergent groups begin to lose confidence not only in the authorities but in the old institutions themselves. . . If changing social conditions provide some free-floating human resources that can be mobilized behind the discontented new leadership, the conditions are ripe for an assault upon the old system" (Easton, 1965b, p. 155).

Justly or unjustly, politically adept handling of public accountability issues carried greater force than any appeals to the ideals of faculty governance and institutional autonomy that the University was able to muster. The defensive posture assumed by the University throughout the conflict would seem no longer a viable option for system response to external demands. As a UW-System Vice President noted, "They [education deans] must be more politically astute, instead of waging a defensive battle. This is necessary or we will keep getting beaten about the head and shoulders."

The University and its political system because of size, power and status have enormous capacity to absorb shocks and blows and emerge eventually relatively unscathed from the fray, This phenomenon was evidenced in the violent campus unrest coupled with the Teaching Assistants Association strike in the early 1970's that could have destroyed a lesser institution. Even the University of Wisconsin System merger, strongly opposed by the Madison campus, was in the end implemented as a system of thirteen relatively autonomous campuses in one system as Madison desired, rather than as one university with thirteen campuses. Complex organizations have ways and means at their disposal to eventually mediate environmental stresses. Echoing this sentiment one University respondent noted, "There will be a gradual dimming of attention to these matters. . . I doubt that there will be a formal reversal of it. We're more likely to see a gradual disappearance."

Although this possibility cannot be ignored, the evidence adduced in this research would suggest that such complacency is dangerous at best. It represents an unhealthy return to the status quo with the system again ignoring the realities of its environment and again placing itself in a reactive posture. Ignoring the lessons of history can be a costly and possibly fatal error.

References

Apple, M.W. (1982). *Education and power*. Boston: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

Apple, M.W. (1985). Education reports and economic realities. In Altbach, P.G., Kelly G.P., & Weis L. (Eds.), *Excellence in education: Perspectives on policy and practice* (pp.105). Buffalo: Prometheus.

Bertrand, A.L. (1972). *Social organization: A general systems and role theory perspective*. Philadelphia: F.A. Davis.

Blauberg, I.V., Sadovsky, V.N., & Yudin, H.G. (1977). *Systems Theory: Philosophical and methodological problems*. Moscow: Progress Publishers.

Bogdan, R.C. & Biklen, S.K. (1982). *Qualitative research for education: An introduction to theory and method*. Boston: Allyn and Bacon.

Clark, B.R. (1971). Faculty organization and authority. In J.V. Baldridge (Ed.), *Academic governance* (pp.236-250). Berkeley: McCutchan.

Clark, B.R. (1983). The organizational saga in higher education. In J.V. Baldridge & T. Deal (Eds.), *The dynamics of organizational change in education* (pp. 373-382). Berkeley: McCutchan.

Corrigan, D. (1985). Politics and teacher education reform. *Journal of Teacher Education*, 36, 8-11.

Curti, M. & Carstensen, V. (1949). *The university of Wisconsin: A history*. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.

Easton, D. (1965a). *A framework for political analysis*. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall.

Easton, D. (1965b). *A systems analysis of political life*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Easton, D. (1966). *A systems approach to political life*. (Publication No.104). Lafeyette, IN: Social Science Education Consortium.

Elam, S.M. (1963). Will Wisconsin accredit NCATE? *Phi Delta Kappan*, 44, 154-159.

Gottschalk, L. (1963). *Understanding history: A primer of historical method*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.

Guba, E.G. & Lincoln, Y.S. (1985). *Effective evaluation: Improving the usefulness of evaluation results through responsive and naturalistic approaches*. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.

Guthrie, J.W. (1983). A new state model of teacher education. *Teacher Education Quarterly*, 10, 1-7.

Hammond, M.F. (1986). Teacher education and the research university. *Review of Higher Education*, 9(2), 193-227.

Hawley, W.D. (1988). Missing pieces of the educational reform agenda: Or why the first and second waves may miss the boat. *Educational Administration Quarterly*, 24(4), 416-437.

Howey, K.R. & Zimpher, N.L. (1986). The current debate on teacher preparation. *Journal of Teacher Education*, 37, 41-49.

Kirst, M.W. (1988). Recent state education reform in the United States: Looking backward and forward. *Educational Administration Quarterly*, 24(3), 319-328.

McLaughlin, M.W., Pfeiffer, S., Swanson-Owens, D., & Yee, S. (1985). *State policy and teaching excellence*. Project Report No. 85-A5. Stanford, CA: Institute for Research on Educational Finance and Governance, School of Education, Stanford University.

Merriam, S.B. (1985). The case study in educational research: A review of selected literature. *Journal of Educational Thought*, 19, 204-217.

Millett, J.D. (1978). *New structures of campus power*. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers.

Moran, W.E. (1972).. a systems view of university organization. In P.W. Hamelman (Ed.), *Managing the university: A systems approach* (pp.3-12). New York: Praeger.

Murray, F.B. (1986). Teacher education: Words of caution about popular reforms. *Change*, 18, 18-25.

National Commission on Excellence in Education. (1983). *A nation at risk*. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office.

Owens, R.G. (1982). Methodological rigor in naturalistic inquiry: Some issues and answers. *Educational Administration Quarterly*, 18, 1-21.

Passow, A.H. (1988). Whither (or wither?) school reform? *Educational Administration Quarterly*, 24(3), 246-256.

Patton, M.Q. (1980). *Qualitative evaluation methods*. Beverly Hills: Sage Publications.

Rist, R.C. (1982). On the application of ethnographic inquiry to education: Procedures and possibilities. *Journal of Research in Science Teaching*, 19, 439-450.

Roth, R.A. (1985). Alternative futures for teacher education. *Action in Teacher Education*, 6, 1-5.

Schuck, R.F. (1985). As colleges of education face the future--reflections of a friendly philistine. *Teacher Educator*, 20, 2-6.

Soltis, J.F. (Ed.). 1987. *Reforming teacher education: The impact of the Holmes group report*. New York: Teachers College Press.

Spring, J. (1985a). *American education: An introduction to social and political aspects* (3rd edition). New York: Longman.

Spring, J. (1985b). Political and economic analysis. In Altbach, P.G., Kelly, G.P., & Weis, L. (Eds.), *Excellence in education: Perspectives on policy and practice*. Buffalo: Prometheus.

Stedman, L.C. (1987). The political economy of recent educational reform reports. *Educational Theory*, 37, 69-76.

Stedman, L.C. & Smith, M.S. (1983). Recent reform proposals for American education. *Contemporary Education Review*, 2.

Stiles, L.J. (1963). Reorganizing accreditation for teacher education. *Phi Delta Kappan*, 45, 31-42.

Travelstead, C.C. (1963). NCATE: Yesterday, today, and tomorrow. *Phi Delta Kappan*, 45, 38-42.

University of Wisconsin System Teacher Education Task Force. (1984, October). *Benchmarks of Excellence*. (Available from University of Wisconsin System, 1700 Van Hise Hall, Madiosn, WI 54706).

Wallenfeldt, E.C. (1983). *American higher education: Servant of the people or protector of special interest?* Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.

Wiggins, S.P. (1964). *Battlefields in teacher education*. Nashville: George Peabody College for Teachers.

Yin, R.K. (1981). The case study as serious research strategy. *Knowlege: Creation, Diffusion, Utilization*, 3, 97-114.

Yin, R.K. (1981). *The case study crisis: Some answers*. Administrative Science Quarterly, 26, 58-64.

Yin, R.K. (1984). *Case study research: Design and methods*. Beverly Hills: Sage Publications.